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Introduction 
Energy can be viewed as a resource or an issue. Just as the news media tend to 
focus on issues rather than resources, so do pollsters. Much or the published and 
publicly-available polling data on energy, therefore, relate to issues that the 
pollsters considered important or timely, like acid rain or nuclear waste, or to 
interesting psycho-social phenomena, like the gap between experts' risk 
estimates and the perceptions of risks by the public. This brief summary of the 
social science research attempts to broaden the understanding of public attitudes 
by drawing largely on a variety of surveys that were designed to learn what 
Europeans think of energy not only as an issue but 35 a resource. 
A major drawback of energy-related polling data analysis over the years has 
been a fixation on headcounts. Pollsters and their public, it seems, look to single 
questions for a yes-no vote on issues. Public opinion on energy is too complex to 
be characterized by a single question. On all subjects, leaders in the polling 
community consider the headcount practice treacherous. To understand the 
public responses to energy questions, it is necessary to place them into the 
framework of larger political, social, or moral issues, such as the person's values 
with respect to the environment and economic prosperity and the corresponding 
beliefs on how different energy systems affect these values in a positive or 
negative way. Attitudes toward related issues, cultural preferences relating to 
lifestyle and self-image, as well as the perceived judgments of the "significant 
others" (peer groups) are important influential factors that shape the position of 
a person toward each energy system. It is beyond the scope of this report to 
include all these variables, but it should be kept in mind that each attitude 
revealed in a survey is part of a unique personality structure that defies rigid 
categorization. The reasons why people form a specific attitude may not at all be 
related to the object of the attitude or its perceived instrumental advantages or 
disadvantages; rather it may be formed as a result of emotional associations, 
social pressure, or symbolic connotations linked to the object in question [1]. 
Empirical research on attitudes towards technology 
The popular view that people in Europe have become more hostile to technology 
is wrong. Most surveys reveal that attitudes towards technology have become 
more ambivalent. Technological advances are not necessarily associated with 
social progress, but there is no doubt in public perception that technological 
advancement is essential for Europe. Ambivalence means that most people 
perceive and value the advantages of technology for their lives, but also 
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acknowledge the problems associated with many technologies, foremost the 
potential adverse impacts on health and environment [2]. 
In spite of this general trend, most attitudes are specific with respect to 
different technologies. Technology is not perceived as a unified block: people hold 
a whole variety of views about different technologies. Only 30% of the population 
(European Union) demonstrate consistent attitudes towards a whole group of 
selected technologies [3]. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate attitudes 
towards technologies according to different classes of technologies. \Vith respect 
to peoples' responses to technologies, three classes emerge from the multitude of 
technologies forming fairly consistent patterns of perceptions: 
- technology as a consumer product (acceptance is part of the market system of 
purchase); 
technology as a tool for work or vocation (acceptance is part of the corporate 
decision making process); 
technology as a neighbor (acceptance is part of a policy making process). 
For the first class of technologies, public perception has improved over time. 
People like their kitchen appliances, stereos, home videos, and other amenities 
of daily life. Acceptance problems are basically confined to technical products 
leading to extensive external effects, such as private cars. The second class of 
technologies, the tools for work, are readily accepted if the workers have time to 
adjust to the new working environment and if the new machines do not pose a 
threat for their workplace. In addition, workers in some countries (like Sweden) 
value the tradition of being able to co-determine the decision ahout the use of new 
technologies. Acceptance problems arise predominantly with the third class of 
technologies, i.e. those facilities that people face in their social environment. 
Siting incinerators or chemical factories are typical examples of the acceptance 
problems linked to technologies as neighbors. 
Attitudes towards technologies differ not only with respect to the class and type 
of technologies, but also with respect to social groups and individual preferences. 
Variance of opinions is large among social groups, but interestingly enough small 
among nations: subcultures, such as environmentalists and industrialists, have 
more in common with their counterparts across nations than with their own 
countrymen or -women of a different subculture. For example, empirical research 
has demonstrated that environmentalists in Australia, Germany, the United 
States and Mexico had more in common than environmentalists and 
entrepreneurs within each one of these countries [4]. The world has developed 
into a place of almost universal subcultures, each of which enjoy similar attitudes 
and world views, while communication barriers become higher and stronger 
between these subcultures within a single society, nation, or continent. 
Many factors influence the perception and evaluation oftechnologies within the 
public. The most important factors are [5]: 
- psychological mechanisms of perception; 
persona} experience with technology; 
personal expectations, with respect to the consequences of technological 
applications; 
personal values, with respect to technology or its usej 
social networks; 
media coverage; 
78 
Public acceptance of energytechonologies 
related attitudes and political OIientations; 
structural variables such as gender, class, education etc. 
If we look at the psychological mechanisms of technology perception, a major 
issue is the evaluation of the uncertain outcomes that people associate with the 
use of technologies. The perception of technological risks has been the focus of 
many studies, because they determine to a large degree how people form attitudes 
about specific technologies. One of the most interesting results of these studies 
was that people use intuitive heuristics (rules of thumb) to conceptualize and 
evaluate risks. In particular, they order and classify technological risks by using 
a scheme of several basic images [6J: 
Risk as a pending danger (Damocles' sword) : Risk are seen as a random threat 
that caD trigger a disaster without prior notice and without sufficient time to 
cope with the hazard involved. This image is linked to artificial risk sources 
with large catastrophic potential. The magnitude of the probability is not 
considered. It is rather the randomness itself that evokes fear and avoidance 
responses. Natural disasters, in contrast, are perceived as regularly occurring 
and thus predictable or related to a special pattern of occurrence (causal, 
temporal or magic). The image of pending danger is therefore particularly 
prevalent in the perception oflarge-scale technologies such as nuclear energy 
or chlorine storage tanks. They evoke strong political protest if people have 
the feeling they were not involved in the decision making process. 
Slow killers (Pandora's Box): Risk is seen as an invisible threat to one's health 
or well-being. Effects are usually delayed and affect only few people at the 
same time. Knowledge about these risks is based on information by others 
rather than on personal experience. These risks pose a major demand for 
trustworthiness in those institutions that provide information and manage the 
hazard. If trust is lost, people demand immediate actions and assign blame to 
these institutions even if risks are very smalL Typical examples of this risk 
class are food additives, pesticides, and chemicals in drinking water. 
Cost-benefit ratio (Athena's Scale): Risks are perceived as a balancing act of 
gains and losses. This concept of risk comes closest to the technical 
understanding of risk. However, this image is only used in peoples' perceptions 
of monetary gains and losses. Typical examples are betting and gambling both 
of which require sophisticated probabilistic reasoning_ People are normally 
able to perform such probabilistic reasoning but only in the context of 
gambling, lotteries, financial investment, and insurance. Laboratory 
experiments show that people orient their judgment about lotteries more 
towards the variance oflosses and gains than towards the expected value. 
Avocational thrill (Hercules' Theme): Often risks are actively explored and 
desired. These risks include all activities for which personal skills are 
necessary to master the dangerous situation. The thrill is derived from the 
enjoyment of having control over one's environment or oneself. Such risks are 
always voluntary and allow personal control over the degree of riskiness. 
In addition to the images that are linked to different risk contexts, the type of 
risk involved and its situational characteristics shape individual riskestimations 
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and evaluations. Psychometric methods have been employed to explore these 
qualitative characteristics of risks. The following contextual variables of risk 
have been found to affect the perceived seriousness of risks [7}: 
the expected number of fatalities or losses: Although the perceived average 
number of fatalities correlates with the perceived riskiness of a technology or 
activity, the relationship is weak and generally explains less than 20% of the 
declared variance. 
the catastrophic potential: Most people show distinctive preferences among 
choices with identical expected values (average risk). Low-probability, 
high-consequence risks are usually perceived as more threatening than more 
probable risks with low or medium consequences. 
situational characteristics: Surveys and experiments have revealed that 
perception of risks is influenced by a series of perceived properties of the risk 
source or the risk situation. Among the most influential factors are: the 
perception of dread with respect to the possible consequences; the conviction 
of having personal control over the magnitude or probability of the risk; the 
familiarity with the risk; the perception of equitable sharing of both benefits 
and risks; and the potential to blame a person or institution responsible for 
the creation of a risky situation. In addition, equity issues playa major role in 
risk perception. 
the beliefs associated with the cause of risk: The perception of risk is often part 
of an attitude that a person holds about the cause of the risk, in our case a 
technology. Attitudes encompass a series of beliefs about the nature, 
consequences, history, and justifiability of such a technology. A person who 
believes that industry policies are guided by greed and profit is more likely to 
think that the risks of industrial pollution are only the "tip of an iceberg". On 
the other hand, a person, who believes that industry provides consumers with 
goods and services they need and value. is likely to link pollutants with 
unpleasant, but essentially manageable, byproducts of industrial production. 
It should be noted that the estimation of seriousness and the judgment about 
acceptability are closely related in technological attitudes. Most people integrate 
information about the magnitude of the risk, the fairness of the risk situation, 
and other qualitative factors into their overall judgment about the (perceived) 
seriousness of the respective risk. 
In addition to psychological factors, social and cultural aspects playa major role 
in the formation of attitudes towards technologies [8]. Values represent general 
orientations or guides that help people to select different options and to rate 
objects or activities in accordance with the desirability of their perceived 
outcomes. Values constitute the frame of reference whereby individuals structure 
their attitudes. Values influence the context in which technologies are placed 
within the attitudinal system of an individual. They are often not directly related 
to a specific attitude, but determine the selection and weighting of information 
that is used for forming an opinion. 
Different positions on technologies do not necessarily imply different value or 
value priorities. Proponents or opponents of nuclear energy, for example, may 
share similar value systems and even rank these values in an identical order of 
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importance. They may differ, however, in their application of these values to the 
energy system in question. Whereas the proponent may believe that nuclear 
energy helps to improve environmental quality, the opponent may be convinced 
that the use of nuclear energy contributes to the deterioration of the environment. 
In this case, the two positions are based on contrasting beliefs about nuclear 
energy and not on diverging views about values. 
A second source of disagreement may be the relative importance that people 
attribute to their values, in particular if some of these values are in conflict with 
each other. Studies on nuclear attitudes, for example, revealed that people with 
favorable attitudes toward nuclear power, t end to weigh the benefits, or 
advantages of nuclear power over the risks to health and environment; although 
these latter items may be relevant values for the nuclear proponent. People who 
consider themselves as opponents of nuclear energy tend to put low emphasis on 
the potential benefits of nuclear power development, while focusing on the risks 
inherent to the technology. 
A third source of disagreement may stem from differences in value systems. In 
this case, positions toward technologies differ as a result of divergent views about 
the goa1(s) that are to be accomplished by providing technologies for production, 
consumption or distribution. Many proponents ofsolar energy, for example, share 
a vision of a soft path for future technological development characterized by 
decentralized energy generation and consumption, with the aid of renewable 
energy SOurces. Other people may not share that vision and opt for a centralized 
energy system that provides convenient comfort without involving any work by 
the consumer. 
In the social sciences, values are placed in clusters that seem to belong together 
although most people are characterized by mixed values systems (9]. These 
cluster refer to: 
traditional values (patriotism, regional or ethnic identity, social status, family 
stability, and others); 
work ethics (diligence, punctuality, efficiency, discipline, deferred 
gratification, and others); 
- hedonistic values (consumption, enjoyment, fun, immediate gratification, and 
others); 
- postmaterialistic values (harmony, social responsibility, environmental 
quality, decentralization, quality of Hfe, and others). 
In contrast to many popular views, there is not a universal shift towards 
postmaterialistic values throughout Europe [10]. It is true that these values have 
become more important and can be found on the value priority list of almost every 
individual, but the claim of a new postmaterlalistic personality is total fiction . 
Most people demonstrate a mix of all value clusters depending on context and 
social relations. A vast majority of people is still interested in gaining additional 
personal income (even if they rate it low on the scale of personal aspirations). 
Even unfashionable virtues such as discipline and efficiency have their place in 
most people's value portfolio. However, many of the traditional and work-related 
values are withdrawn from situations in which they used to be the dominating 
orientations. This has been the case with technologies: they were perceived as 
manifestations of work ethics and hedonistic values (production and 
consumption), but are increasingly related to postmaterialistic concerns. This 
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shift in value application is partially responsible for the perception of 
ambivalence. which is so typical for modern attitudes towards technologies. 
Since values have an impact on technology evaluation. acceptance of 
technologies relies on the requirement that technological perceptions load high 
on each value cluster except for the traditional values. Traditional values are 
normally disassociated with the use of technologies. Hence. technologies need to 
appeal to the three remaining value clusters, at least to some degree. Each value 
cluster provides a different function: 
PostmateriaJistic values are linked with moral connotations and provide social 
and cultural legitimation; 
- work values are associated with pragmatic orientations and provide 
functionality; 
- hedonistic values lead to the highest personal motivation and provide 
incentives. 
Acceptance of technologies depends on forging links between the three value 
clusters and the development or use ofthe technologies under consideration. That 
is why technology design and development should acknowledge and incorporate 
the likely implications of new products or processes for the three major value 
clusters. If the perceived implications meet all three clusters. acceptance 
problems are unlikely to playa major role in the diffusion process. 
Empirical research on energy technologies 
Current polls indicate that the perception of an energy crisis has withered. 
Together with a decrease in the perceived importance of energy issues, pollsters 
discovered that the public is less and less concerned about the severity of the 
energy situation. Based on the perception of having a choice between different 
energy systems again, the public currently feels more confident in specifying 
conditions for the future development of energy systems. The percentage of people 
who favor the development of new energy sources, even on the expense of 
environmental degradation has declined considerably during the last years [111. 
The low awareness level is also reflected in the decrease of media coverage for 
energy issues. Energy problems have received far less media attention over the 
last five years than the problem area of the environment in general. 
Environmental concerns-acid rain, wastes, ozone depletion, pollution in 
general-have become more salient issues in the past years. Since many of the 
environmental concerns are linked with the generation or consumption of energy, 
attitudes toward energy systems have become more closely related to the 
perception of environmental problems. The traditional view that energy 
constitutes an independent subject of the public agenda might need a revision: 
energy problems in the late 1980s and early 1990s appear to be integrated into 
a Jarger framework of environmental concerns and attitudes that determine the 
position toward different energy systems and toward future energy policies [12]. 
A peculiar feature of energy attitudes is the difference between expected and 
desired pathway to meet future energy demand. Most people expect that nuclear 
energy will become more important than it is today, some even believe it will 
become the dominant source of energy, while hardly anyone (even in France) 
desires such a development. Ifpeople are asked which energy system they would 
like to have installed in the future, rather than asking them which they expect 
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to be installed, preferences often reverse. In a West·German study, 52% of all 
respondents expected nuclear to be the primary energy source of the future and 
only 5% solar energy. But asked about their preferred energy option, 35% named 
solar energy first and only 25% nuclear energy. The gap between perceived reality 
and desirability turned out to be a major motivation for anti·nuclear activism 
[13J. 
However, it should be noted that attitudes towards energy systems differ 
considerably among the member states of the European Union. They also 
demonstrate specific patterns depending on the energy source and its application. 
The following paragraphs deal with each major energy source separately. 
Nuclear Energy 
Nuclear energy is still the most controversial energy source in Europe. Public 
confidence in nuclear energy has become lower in most countries and stagnates 
in some. The recent Eurobarometer (1993) lists the following percentages for 
nuclear opposition: 
more than 50% opposition in: Denmark, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal 
more than 40% opposition in: West·Germany, Spain, Luxembourg 
more than 30% opposition in: Belgium, East·Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK 
more than 20% opposition in: France 
Supporters of nuclear energy constitute less than one third of the surveyed 
population in all EU countries. In addition to the quantity of antinuclear 
attitudes, nuclear energy polarizes public opinion more than any other energy 
technology. People with pro·nuclear or anti·nuclear viewpoints have strong 
convictions and are likely to blame the occurrence of social or economic problems 
on the activities of the other camp. In spite of the intensity of attitudes on both 
sides, willingness to act according to one's attitude is twice as strong with nuclear 
opponents than it is with nuclear proponents. Opinion surveys show that public 
concerns aboul nuclear energy focus on the following issues: 
doubt about economic necessity; 
fear of large·scale catastrophes; 
storage of nuclear waste. 
In addition to these concerns, people tend to be more critical towards nuclear 
energy if they place high importance on postmaterialistic values, regard nature 
as a fragile system that needs human protection, and show a lack of trust in 
governmental and economic institutions. Furthermore, the belief that 
alternatives to nuclear energy are available and feasible (if only the political 
system would change its priorities) is a major building block for an antinuclear 
attitude. On the other side, people with a more pro-nuclear attitude share the 
conviction that, in the long run, nuclear energy is the only viable energy source 
and that the institutions, which promote or control nuclear energy, are 
trustworthy and credible. 
Demographic and social variables influence the position towards nuclear 
energy, but the relationship differ from country to country and show complex 
influential patterns. However, some basic trends can be revealed: 
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- Women are more skeptical about nuclear energy and usually more favorable 
toward other energy sources than men. 
- Younger persons are, usually, more opposed to nuclear energy and other 
established large-scale technologies than older people. In some countries, more 
positive attitudes toward nuclear energy can be found among the very young 
(20 years and younger) than among the middle age groups. Younger persons 
seem to associate nuclear energy with a centralized, techno-centered way of 
generating electricity that is in opposition to their personal values and 
lifestyles. 
- Technically oriented persons with some college education are more likely to be 
in favor of nuclear energy, while highly educated professionals trained in social 
sciences and humanities tend to oppose nuclear energy more frequently. 
Natural scientists have a more pro-nuclear attitude than the average citizen. 
- The higher the socia-economic status, the more favorable are the attitudes 
toward nuclear power. This relationship is weaker in the Northern part of the 
European Union and stronger in the southern parts. Doubts about the 
technical and economic feasibility of nuclear energy have influenced the 
attitudes of economic ~lites in Scandinavian countries more profoundly than 
in West Germany or Switzerland. 
- Conservative voters in most countries tend to be more pro-nuclear and pro-coal 
than voters of left parties. But attitudes toward nuclear power are widely 
wspersed among all different political groups and party affiliations. The 
nuclear issue evolved as a new topic that did not fit in the traditional political 
framework of left versus right. Many countries experienced the emergence of 
Green parties that center around anti-nuclear policies and gather support 
from people with skeptical attitudes toward nuclear power. 
Business executives and nuclear experts express most support for nuclear 
energy while environmentalists and students express most opposition toward 
nuclear energy. Elected officials tend to be more in line with public perception 
of energy systems while appointed officials, such as regulators or 
administrative staff, seem to be more oriented toward pro-nuclear ~lites, such 
as the scientific community and business groups. 
Coal 
In most European countries, coal is regarded as a domestic, reliable and familiar 
energy source. Most people are aware of the fact that coal in Europe is expensive, 
but value the security of supply associated with a native resource. Coal is 
perceived to help most European nations to gain independence and to assure high 
employment. Although occupational risk in coal mining is still high compared to 
other occupational hazards, safety issues are not part of the public agenda on 
coal. Instead, most concerns focus on the environmental impacts of burning coal. 
In addition to the classic pollution problems, the recent discussion about 
greenhouse gases has increased public awareness about the negative impacts of 
coal. These concerns, however, are still rather diffuse. Public surveys show that 
most people have difficulty linking global warming to fossil fuel combustion and 
differentiating between the destruction of the Ozone layer and the greenhouse 
effects (14]. Yet, coal is always associated with pollution and high negative side 
effects for the natural environment. 
This experience of conflicting values has led to an ambiguous evaluation of coal. 
In resolving this conflict, most people are less inclined to oppose the use of coal, 
but to encourage more activities to reduce the environmental impact of this 
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technology. In this respect. most people express confidence that coal·fired power 
plants can be made cleaner and will be made cleaner in the years to come. In 
contrast to nuclear energy, a vast majority of those surveyed prefer a policy of 
demanding cleaner coal processing (leaving the problem of Carbondioxid aside) 
rather than abandoning coal altogether. An acceptance crisis for coal is hence 
unlikely to occur. 
Oil 
Attitudes towards oil have been rather negative since the first oil crisis in 1973. 
As stated before, such negative evaluations have little political impact as long as 
opinions do not polarize and mobilize social or political actions. Most people are 
convinced that Europe needs to reduce oil imports and to replace the use of oil 
with other, preferable native energy sources. However, this preference does not 
evoke the feeling of a substantial threat necessary to cause people to become more 
active. Concerns about oil center around oil spills, damage by acid rain, and 
greenhouse gases. People perceive private traffic as the major source of pollution 
and show verbal readiness to reduce the amount of private transportation. Their 
behavior, however, does not match these "good" intentions. The use of private 
means of transportation has steadily increased over the last two decades and is 
likely to increase further, in spite of major efforts to offer extensive public 
transportation opportunities. Positive developments can be found among others 
in some Dutch, Danish, and Swiss cities, that succeeded in reducing carloads by 
a dual strategy: improving public transportation and creating economic and 
regulatory barriers to ban or restrict the use of private vehicles inside the city. 
Gas 
Natural gas appears to be the least controversial energy source among the 
traditional energy fuels. In spite of the fact that gas produces basically the same 
pollutants as oil or coal, it has become less associated with these pollutants, since 
the emission level per unit energy output compares favorably to the other fossil 
fuels. The relative advantages in comparison to coal and oil made gas an 
environmentally clean source of energy in the public eye. Concerns focus on risks 
of explosion and, for those countries without domestic supplies, on security of 
supply, 
Conseruation and Renewables 
There is hardly any other area of research for which people are willing to spend 
more tax money and national efforts than for the development of alternative 
energy systems and conservation efforts. Surveys show that people would allocate 
up to 30% of the national funds, devoted to research and development, for solar 
and other renewable energy sources [15]. Solar energy is associated with low 
environmental impact and long term energy security; perceived disadvantages 
relate to costs and reliability of continuous supply. Most Europeans are convinced 
that more funds for research and development could help to overcome the 
disadvantages of solar systems and to achieve competitiveness with other 
alternatives. The positive beliefs about the prospects of solar energy are matched 
by strong emotional and affective associations that most people link to solar 
energy. Using a semantic differential technique to measure the emotional 
attributes that respondents associate with different energy systems, two 
independent studies (one from West.Germany and one from Japan) came to the 
conclusion that solar energy rated best on all emotional attributes whereas 
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nuclear energy was usually rated worst or close to worst in comparison with other 
energy technologies [16]. 
Asked about potential risks of renewable energy sources. most people are 
unable (or unwilling) to name a single one. Most people expect that renewables 
could meet a large share of today's energy needs if the economic and political 
decision makers would be more willing to place a higher priority on their 
development. The strong preference for energy conservation and renewable 
energy sources contrasts with the actual market penetration of solar or similar 
equipment that people can purchase privately. One could paraphrase this 
situation with the statement: "All love it. but nobody buys it". Reasons for the 
slow diffusion of consumer technologies. which promote energy conservation or 
use renewable energy sources, are: 
price disadvantages. compared to conventional systems; 
large investment costs; 
uncertainty about payoffsj 
uncertainty about efficacy of possible actions; 
lack ofinfrastructure; 
lack of unanimity among experts about usefulness or efficiency of different 
options; 
expectations that equipment will improve over time (especially price-efficiency 
ratio). 
The discrepancy between attitudes and personal behavior is highly pronounced 
in the area of renewable energy sources and conservation. Diffusion of technology 
proceeds at a slow path and some technologies are rejected in spite of the fact 
that they provide economic benefits compared to conventional systems. The 
energy situation in Europe is hence characterized by an explosive stalemate. On 
one hand people reject large-seale-technologies, in particular nuclear energy and 
prefer decentralized systems based on renewable energy sources, on the other 
hand they are unwilling or unprepared to invest in these decentralized systems. 
Likewise public utilities and many policy making institutions respond to public 
pressure by reducing or keeping constant the share of centralized energy supply 
systems, but lack the motivation to push substitute systems into the market. This 
gap is going to develop into a full crisis when most nuclear power plants will reach 
their estimated lifetime of30 years between 2000 and 2010. 
From acceptance to acceptability 
The present situation that large-scale-technologies meet public opposition and 
potential substitutes not vigorously pursued by consumers and policy makers 
alike demands a reflection on the normative implications of social science 
investigations for public preferences and policy evaluation. The major question 
is: "How safe or environmentally clean is safe or clean enough?" This question 
has been raised by a large number of scholars and practitioners without offering 
a satisfactory answer. The discussion has clarified the issue. however. It has 
become apparent that there is no formal method to determine acceptability of 
technologies other than approval by those who bear the consequences. In 
particular, the scholarly debate revealed the following insights [17]: 
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Risk comparisons are not sufficient to justify the acceptability of a technology. 
The only logically compelling comparison is between a situation with and a 
situation without the technology, under the premise that there is no third 
solution. 
Technical performance is not the only criterion for judging acceptability, so 
that additional, unfortunately contested social and economic criteria have to 
be included. 
Cost-benefit analysis is needed, but insufficient to determine the social 
preferences for technologies. The selection of methods for translating concerns 
and non-materialistic impacts into monetary values and the choice of discount 
factors rely on subjective judgments difficult to justify by objective reasoning. 
Decision analytical methods might offer the best solution for determining 
acceptability. because they compare risks and benefits of different decision 
options on all criteria that humans value in this situation. The application of 
these methods demand subjective input, however, in the form of choosing 
evaluative criteria and assigning weights to each criterion. 
Formal methods may offer assistance to policy makers for structuring and 
ordering preferences, but they do not provide automatic answers to the question 
of acceptable energy technologies. Subjective values and knowledge are integral 
parts of such decisions. These subjective inputs can come from the elected officials 
who are supposed to represent the public will at large. However, most European 
societies show signs of reduced confidence of the public in their decision making 
bodies and of a reluctance to accept the decisions of representative bodies of 
government. For this reason, many countries are experimenting with novel 
models of decision making providing public platforms for mediation and citizen 
involvement [18J. In particular, if fundamental decisions about the energy future 
of a whole continent are at stake, a major debate among all relevant groups is 
needed to mobilize sufficient support from the plural interest groups within 
Europe. Among the most promising instruments to organize such a public 
platform are applications of mediation and cooperative discourses [19]. In both 
cases, public groups are invited to a series of "round table" negotiations assisted 
by a professional mediator. The role of the mediator is to identify common 
interests and values among the participants and to help design a set of policy 
recommendations that are agreeable to all parties. Such a discourse depends on 
several structural conditions (20J: 
reaching a consensus on the procedure that the participants want to employ 
in order to derive the final decision or compromise, such as majority vote or 
the involvement of a mediator; 
basing their factual claims on the "state of the art" of scientific knowledge and 
other forms of legitimate knowledge; in the case of scientific dissent all 
relevant camps should be represented; 
interpreting factual evidence in accordance with the laws of formal logic and 
argumentative reasoning; 
disclosing the values and preferences of each party, thus avoiding hidden 
agendas and strategic game playing; 
attempting to find a fair solution whenever conflicting values or preferences 
occur, including compensation or other forms of benefit exchange. 
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There is no doubt that such a discourse can only be the ideal goal for reconciling 
social and political conflicts. But it is one of the major challenges of modern 
democratic societies to find a process that facilitates the involvement of all 
affected 'parties and, at the same time, produces a prudent and informed 
judgment based on expertise and knowledge. Applied to energy policies, it 
appears to be wise to refrain from discussions about energy technologies (which 
lead to polarized and stereotyped debates). but to focus on criteria that future 
energy systems must meet in order to be judged "acceptable". Such criteria could 
be based partly on public concerns, partly on new scientific and technological 
insights. which allow modifications ofthe existing energy systems. Once common' 
criteria are established and approved by all parties, it would be up to the 
engineers and scientists to develop or modify technologies that would meet these 
criteria. Whether these technologies use nuclear, fossil or other forms of primary 
energy should not be of concern to the parties as long as their criteria are met. 
In accordance with the prevailing concerns of the public, such criteria would 
probably cover the following items: 
limits on catastrophic potential; 
- reduction of pollution and other environmental impacts; 
no additional burden for future generationsj 
compatibility with economic competitiveness on the international market; 
- avoidance of inequitable solutions; 
preference for local or regional authority, responsibility, and control. 
In addition, it is useful to involve the public more directly in the process of 
licensing and operating energy facilities. Although a popular trend among policy 
makers today is to restrict public input as a means to overcome costly delays in 
facility siting, reducing public involvement may produce counterintuitive results. 
People will lose trust in their governing bodies and mobilize public pressure 
which normally results in even further delays or at least additional burdens for 
the licensing agencies. Many political decisions made without public input had 
to be revised under severe pressure from public groups after the decision. Such 
an after-the-fact-adjustment is much more detrimental to public confidence than 
taking the detour of involving the public before the decision is made. Once the 
public is involved it is more difficult to show a NIMBY (not in my back yard) 
response since sharing power with the public means sharing responsibility. 
Including the public implies, however, that different options are available. 
Participation is different from information or public relations. Selection of 
technologies, conditions of operation, determination of best sites are all potential 
decisions that could be opened to public input. 
Public involvement should not be confined to the licensing and construction of 
the plant. Once in operation, people may still fear negative impacts or 
irresponsible behavior by the plant operators. Among the possibilities to have the 
public participate in the supervision and control of the respective plant are [21]: 
Incorporation of members of the public on review or control boards; 
sharing information on the results of the continuous monitoring of 
environmental impacts; 
showing facility performance data (inc. environmental emissions) in public 
places; 
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giving representatives of the public authority to monitor safety provisions; 
- giving people the possibility to participate in emergency planning. 
Research needs 
The perception of technologies, in particular energy technologies, has been the 
focus of many studies in Europe and worldwide [22]. The first priority in the 
European context is to make these studies more available and accessible to the 
interested public. Many public officials have either no access to the results of 
these studies or prefer to ignore them. This situation has lead to major problems 
when allocating research funds, designing communication programs, and 
defining energy policies. One reason for the lack of attention that social studies 
on public attitudes have received in the past is the confusion caused by the lack 
ofintegration and synthesis with respect to the multitude and variety of studies 
undertaken within the European Union. Another reason may be the language 
barrier between representatives of the different sciences. Far many technically 
trained audiences it is hard to read and understand the sociological jargon. The 
first step should therefore be a concentrated effort to collect, synthesize, and 
interpret in common language terms the major results of the existing studies and 
to disseminate these reviews to economic, political, and social decision makers. 
Funds for more empirical research are certainly necessary, but their usefulness 
depends on a concerted effort to make social science investigations more 
accessible and productive for the policy arena. 
Within the field of attitude studies, the main focus ofthe existing research areas 
has been on the structure of attitudes and the causal factors underlying 
attitudinal commitments. Future research should be directed towards: 
- an analysis of values and cultural patterns in public perception, concentrating 
on the relationships between images of nature, technology, and social visions 
for the future; 
- a broad analysis of perceptions of nature and technology in different countries 
(with emphasis on qualitative research methods); 
- an emphasis on in-depth studies of motivations and underlying beliefs 
(cognitive maps and cultural biases) with respect to key technologies (energy, 
biotechnology, communication); 
- the role of attitudes towards energy systems for value commitments and 
lifestyles. 
In addition to the usual static snapshots of attitudes and opmlons, more 
research is needed to investigate the development of attitudes and behavioral 
responses over time. This includes the investigation of the dynamic processing of 
information in pluralistic societies. Emphasis should be placed on attitude 
formation and information processing, social network analysis, and more 
intensive studies of the lifecycle of information from the source via the media to 
the receiver. A particularly promising approach to dynamic modeling is the 
theoretical concept of social amplification of risk [23]. 
Attitudes towards technologies are less and less formed on the basis of personal 
experience. They are products of personal communication among the social 
network of each individual and, in particular, the reception of information 
through the media. Social science research has focused so far on content analysis 
of the media and the selection rules of journalists and media types for scientific 
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and technical information [241 . Little is known about the reception process by the 
final consumer of media reports. Recent U.S.·studies support the thesis that 
receivers are extremely selective in what they take from the media and how they 
incorporate this information into their attitudinal system [25]. It would be 
worthwhile to concentrate future research efforts on the reception of energy 
related media coverage (including the electronic media) and to reconstruct the 
selection and understanding process among different types of receivers. In 
particular, the following questions should be addressed: 
How does the framing of an information shape the reception process? 
How does the experience of competing messages influence people's perception 
process? 
How do people construct their own messages from a given set of media cues? 
What kind of energy related information is likely to be emphasized or 
attenuated in the media and what messages reach the final receiver? 
- How does media information interact with information from informal social 
networks? 
A final area for social science research is the investigation of normative 
processes for determining acceptability of energy technologies and energy 
systems. First, the role of formal methods to assist policy makers in evaluating 
different options needs to be assessed and systematically evaluated. Although 
formal models do not suffice to ensure rational decision making, they playa major 
role for structuring the debate and constructing, as well as critiquing lines of 
arguments. A review of technical, economic, and political procedures to make 
prudent judgments about acceptability is therefore needed. 
The main emphasis. however, should be devoted to the design and 
implementation of discourse models, that promise to bring different interest 
groups together and to make them contemplate about evalua(ive criteria and 
their relative weights for future energy technolOgies (26]. We need better 
guidelines for structuring such discourses and more practical experiences for 
improving the probability of successful negotiations. In particular, models are 
needed that include a fair proportion of the affected public, without compromising 
the competence of the decision process or its outcome. Among others, 
investigations should focus on: 
exploring legal possibilities for arbitration and mediation in the European 
Union; 
investigating social and political prerequisites for environmental "round 
tables" ; 
completing a survey of mediation and participation methods and experiences 
in different European countries; 
- evaluating .and critiquing existing models of public participation and 
mediation; 
testing novel procedures of mediation and participation (theoretical and 
practical). 
Conclusions 
Social science research has revealed many features of technological perception 
and acceptance. This research provides a rough understanding ofthe factors that 
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influence people's evaluation of energy technologies. We still need a better 
understanding of the dynamic processes of attitude formation and technology 
evaluation and more insights into the effects of values and images on 
technological attitudes. The main bottleneck, however, is not so much the lack of 
studies or data, but the slow process of making insights from these investigations 
accessible and useful for public policy making. 
With respect to energy technologies, public interest has been fading over the 
last two decades, as a result of more abundant supply and decreasing fuel prices. 
Security of supply is still regarded as a major goal of energy policies, but this goal 
appears to be less threatened than 20 years ago. The absence of perceived 
constraints in the energy supply situation has caused a more selective attitude 
system towards different energy sources. There is strong support among most 
Europeans to decrease the dependence from foreign oil imports, but not at any 
price. In particular, energy systems that are believed to harm the environment 
are clearly rejected even if they promise more energy independence. 
Furthermore, energy issues are part of a larger framework of beliefs that relate 
to the role and function of technologies with respect to environmental quality and 
economic prosperity. If people are asked about specific energy systems, they 
search for clues that provide them with the context of environmental and 
economic impacts on which they like to base their judgment. Clues that suggest 
environmental harm with the implementation of an energy project lead to strong 
opposition; clues that suggest economic benefits, in particular with respect to 
highly esteemed goals (such as employment or national independence), cause 
most respondents to express favorable positions toward the energy technology in 
question. As soon as both value clusters come into play, environmental concerns 
take usually priority over economic benefits. This is even true for the 1993 survey 
of the Eurobarometer, in spite of the economic crisis in most European countries. 
The general impression, however, seems to be that people would like to avoid 
the conflict between these two value clusters, but if forced to assign priorities, 
they rather choose environmental quality than economic development. A huge 
majority appears to support environmental protection even if this may imply 
(modest> sacrifices in terms of economic growth or energy dependency [28]. 
Perceived benefits of different energy sources are usually confined to beliefs 
about security of supply, availability, convenience, and cleanness. The risks are 
usually related to potential detriments for health and environment, trend toward 
economic and political centralization, the possibility of jeopardizing civil rights, 
and others. The degree to which these perceived benefits or risks are associated 
with each energy system determines together with the desirability and 
importance of each belief dimension the formation of a person's attitude. 
The most favored energy policies are conservation and the development of solar 
energy. Conservation is conceptualized as efficient use of raw energy and most 
people believe that they have considerably increased their effort to conserve more 
energy. Statistical data, however, indicate that the conservation effect is less 
dramatic than the effect that people perceive and that energy savings have only 
occurred for non-electric use of energy, but not for electricity. Similarly, most 
people would favor the development of solar power and express the desirability 
of this power source for the future, but actual sales of solar equipment are 
plummeting. 
The traditional energy sources, coal, gas . and oil, are not associated with any 
enthusiasm, but also not with strict rejection. The recent discussion on the 
greenhouse effect has already left a mark on people's perception of coal energy, 
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but the preferred solution seems to be cleaning up the effiuents rather than 
replacing coal with other energy sources. Oil is still seen as a problem for national 
independence. The perception of abundant energy supply, however, has put the 
replacement of oil in a low priority category. The recent oil spills have alerted the 
European public to the environmental hazards associated wi th oil transportation. 
They confirmed the European dislike for oil, but the prevailing negative attitude 
is not strong enough to cause any serious political or collective action. Gas sails 
along with oil and coal: the absence of obvious environmental problems makes it 
the least controversial energy together with hydroelectric power. Nuclear power 
is still highly debated, although the strong polarization into proponents and 
opponents has been replaced by a more pragmatic attitude on both sides. On one 
hand, nuclear energy is perceived by many as a vital and necessary energy source 
for the future, on the other hand safety concerns and concerns about waste 
disposal have caused a skeptical, if not negative, attitude toward nuclear power 
plants among the majority of Europeans. The overall trend in public opinion over 
the last years is clearly negative, although the outcome of such a survey relies 
heavily on the wording of the question. 
We expect that a pragmatic approach to energy policies will find most public 
approval. Such an approach must incorporate, however, people's concerns about 
environmental impacts and long-term safety consequences. Future acceptance of 
coal energy will depend on the ability to reduce emissions constantly, although 
the threat of global warming can only be mitigated by reducing the share of coal 
combustion. Future acceptance of nuclear energy will rely on a clear 
demonstration of the need for more electricity generating plants, a continuing 
record of safe operation, a reduction in catastrophic potential, and a satisfactory 
solution for high level waste disposal (28). In order to overcome the present 
stalemate in energy policies (opposition to nuclear energy and market failure of 
conservation and renewable energy), we need more efforts to find mediated 
agreements among the major players of society. To facilitate such a process, more 
research is needed to develop procedures for conflict resolution and social 
learning. 
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